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ABSTRACT
Increased concentration in ownership of retail and wholesale food companies in the United
States naturally leads to the question “How  does concentration of ownership affect consumers?”
Does it lead to higher or lower food prices, better or worse service, more or less  choice between
stores and among products, and more or less employment and earning opportunities in the food
sector?  
Since the early 1980's  the percent of total sales captured by the top four supermarket chains
have gone from 18 to 22 percent; food prices decreased, food expenditures relative to income and
employment and earnings have all fallen modestly. Choice and service are harder to measure.
Competition at the local level appears to be alive and well since numerous types of food retailers offer
attractive substitutes for food purchased in a grocery store. 
The relationship between concentration, prices and profits has been studied and examined for
several decades using various economic and business theories and several sources of data.  These
studies speak to the overall behavior and performance of the industry and provide a perspective on
the consolidation and shifts in power that appear to be taking place. The results of many of these
studies are summarized in this paper. 
Findings focus on two major questions: 1) Does the concentration of retail food firms in local
markets increase food prices and firms’ profits? 2) Has the retail sector become relatively more
profitable and, thus,  more powerful than the manufacturing sector? The results are mixed, especially
with regard to price.  Concentration tends to be  associated with both increased and decreased prices.
Recent work indicates prices tend to increase in dry grocery items, but not in fresh and chilled foods.
And, concentration at the wholesale level may lower food prices.   Profits of the parent company
generally rise with concentration, but the reason is unclear.  Most studies conclude it is due to lower
costs made possible by economies of scale in procurement or vertical coordination with suppliers and
better use of  information technology.  There was no evidence that retailers’ profits are increasing
faster than food manufacturers’ profits.Working Paper 98-04
The Retail Food Industry Center
University of Minnesota
CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP  IN FOOD RETAILING:
A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ABOUT CONSUMER IMPACT
Dr. Jean D. Kinsey
Copyright © 1998 by Kinsey.  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears
on all such copies.
The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the authors.  They are not necessarily
endorsed by the Department of Food Science and Nutrition, by The Retail Food Industry Center,
or by the University of Minnesota.
The University of Minnesota is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to
its programs, facilities, and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual
orientation.
For information on other titles in this series, write The Retail Food Industry Center, University 
of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics, 1994 Burford Avenue, 317 Classroom Office
Building, St. Paul, MN 55108-6040, USA, phone Mavis Sievert (612) 625-7019, or E-mail
msievert@dept.agecon.umn.edu.  Also, for more information about the Center and for full text 
of working papers, check our World Wide Web site [http://trfic.umn.edu].CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP  IN FOOD RETAILING:




Market Structure/Market Power/ Performance...............................................................6
Concentration and Prices................................................................................................9
Retail versus Manufacturer Power and Profits...............................................................13
Measuring Profit................................................................................................15
Evidence of a Power/Profit Shift?......................................................................17
International Evidence.......................................................................................19





List of Tables and Figures:    Page
Table 1 Total Retail Grocery Stores: Share of Stores and Share of Sales - 1997: U.S....4        
Table 2 Return on Sales and Equity of Nine Leading U.S. Supermarket Chains,
 1996 or 1997 .............................................................................................................14
Figure 1 Food Prices Wages and Costs (1984-1994)......................................................2
Figure 2 Industrial Organization Model: Structure, Conduct, Performance....................81
Concentration of Ownership in Food Retailing:
 A Review of the Evidence About Consumer Impact
Introduction
Increased concentration of ownership in retail and wholesale food companies in the United
States is catching the attention of the press, academics, and government regulators. Following the
announcement that Alberton’s was buying American Stores, the headlines in the Los Angeles Times
on August 5, 1998 read “Mergers, Food and Fears; Trend Among Supermarkets Raises Consumer
Concern.”  The national  ranking,  by sales, among the top ten retail food (supermarket)  companies
is volatile. Wal-Mart moved from number ten to seven to two within a few months between 1996 and
early 1998. (Food Institute Report, 1998; Top 100 Grocery..,1997).  Albertsons will move from
number seven to number one, pending approval of their buy out.  There is an average of  54 mergers
or acquisitions  a year in this business sector, but the number of stores that enter and exit annually are
about equal (USDA,1996). In September of 1998, the top four retail food companies (Albertsons,
Kroger, Wal-Mart, Safeway)  account for 22 percent of annual retail grocery sales and have 18.5
percent of individual  supermarket stores, but only 4.4 percent of the total retail food stores (Food
Institute Report, 1998).
In an environment where mergers and acquisitions are common and local or regional
companies buy out each other to gain market share, it is natural to ask, “How does concentration of
ownership affect consumers?”  In searching for metrics to measure the effect on consumers, one
typically looks at differences in retail food prices and profits in localities with and without high
concentration. Other metrics of interest are levels of service, a choice among stores, the variety of
products available, and employment and earnings opportunities available in the retail food sector.  2





Examining changes in these metrics at the national level show that between 1984 and 1994
percentage changes in  retail food prices, marketing costs, and workers’ earnings all moved both up
and down from year to year, but prices and workers earnings trended down and marketing costs, as
measured by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),  trended up (Figure 1). The
percent of total retail grocery sales captured by the top four retail chains went from 18 to 22 percent
during this time. Food expenditures as a percent of personal disposable income has fallen steadily since
1960, reaching  about 11 percent in 1998. Food prices tend to be  more volatile than the overall
consumer price  index, but they fall in line with general price changes in the long run.  Employment
and earnings in the industry have declined in real terms. Measuring levels of service and choice is less
precise, but casual observation indicates that when there are more large and similar stores in an area,
small firms tend to enter to fill niches with unique products and services. Some examples are Trader
Joe’s, Whole Foods, Peapod, Streamline, other Internet companies, and a whole host of local
delicatessens, caterers, and specialty shops. There are some 126,000 retail food (grocery)  outlets in
the United States; supermarkets make up only 24 percent of them by number, though 76.6 percent by
sales  (Table 1).  At the local level there is still a lot of competition for retail food stores, even where
a very few large national or international store brands (chains) dominate the market. It is relatively
easy to enter the food business, and  there are numerous competitive retail outlets for food,  including
fast food places, restaurants, and nontraditional places like gasoline stations, convenience stores, and
discount general merchandise stores.  Furthermore, large stores with the same “brand” name often
compete with each other for the same customers, especially if some of them are franchised to
independent operators and others are company owned. Parent company ownership does not,
necessarily decrease local competition. 4
Table 1
Total Retail Grocery Stores: Share of Stores and Share of Sales - 1997, U.S.  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type Number of  Percent  Percent
Stores Units Sales
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supermarkets  30,300 24.1 76.6
Chains    18,955 15.1 60.0
Independents  11,345   9.0 16.6
Convenience   56,000 44.4   6.3
Wholesale
Clubs       730   0.6   4.7
Other   38,970 30.9 12.4
Total 126,000 100% 100%
Total Sales $436.3 bil.  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Food Institute Report, 1998. 
Determining whether increased concentration in ownership is  associated with higher consumer
food prices, or other outcomes that might harm consumers, is not as straight forward as one might
expect. Well-known concentration measures such as the Herfindahl Index (see Appendix A)  or the
CR-4 ratio (percent of sales by the top four companies)  mask intra-company and intra-community
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competition. Almost half of  local communities, (metropolitan statistical areas, MSA) have a CR-4
ratio of more than 80 percent (Geithman and Marion, 1993).  Food prices are increasingly difficult to5
compare from one firm (or community)  to the next as special discounts, coupons, and loyalty
programs offer price discrimination opportunities to many shoppers within a store.  So, the metrics
are not clean, and theories about the motivation for mergers and acquisitions conflict. The most
commonly spoken motivation  in 1998 is that concentration of ownership at the retail/wholesale level
gives  larger companies economics of scale which gives them bargaining power with suppliers of food.
This bargaining power results in procuring food at lower cost. If, simultaneously, local competition
from a variety of food retailers prevents monopoly pricing, consumers are likely to benefit.  
The  academic literature  pertaining to market structure, power,  and performance  speaks to
the overall behavior and performance of the industry and provides a perspective on the  consolidation
and shifts in power that we observe in the retail food industry today. The effects of concentration have
been studied and examined for several decades using various economic and business theories and
several sources of data. 
Academic literature on the relationship between market power, food prices, and food firms’
profitability, is reviewed in the remainder of this paper. That which is reviewed have been published
in the United States and the United Kingdom over the past twenty years.  The basic frameworks for
analyses are presented, followed by a review of findings from several research studies.  The overall
results of academic research are consistent with observed change in the retail food industry, even
though there is notable disagreement among researchers about the effect of market concentration on
prices and profits and about why the observed relationships occur. (What follows draws heavily from
Kinsey, 1998a.)  6
Market Structure /Market Power/ Performance
An extensive body of literature has grown up around the question of whether there is market
power among retail grocery stores that leads to higher food prices. Public policy makers are
particularly concerned about monopoly power in retail food firms because this retail sector sells
necessities that sustain life.  Therefore, rising food prices can infringe on household budgets, slow
discretionary spending for other consumer goods, and limit national economic growth.  In addition,
rising food prices can jeopardize the nutrition and health of poor people and increase government
expenditures for food stamps and other public programs.  In the 1970's, inflation in the United States
and much of  Europe was often more than 10 percent and  rising rapidly.  In this type of an economic
environment, anything that contributes to inflation is of concern. Congressional hearings were held to
investigate whether lax enforcement of  antitrust policy had lowered retail competition and lead to
higher food prices.   
Indeed, concentration, as measured by the percent of local market sales shared by the four
largest grocery store (supermarket) chains in 164 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA)  in the United
States, increased from 71 percent in 1977 to 77 percent in 1987.  During that time the percent of
MSAs that had a four-firm concentration ratio of more than 80 percent went from 27 to 46 (Geithman
and Marion, 1993). 
 In the late 1970's, research about monopoly power in food retailing was commissioned from
the University of Wisconsin by the United States Congress.  Bruce Marion and several colleagues
(1977, 1979)  produced the seminal work in this area.  Like most economists at that time, they used
the well-known structure-conduct-performance model of industrial organization put forth by Bain
(1968) and Mason (1939).  A truncated version of this model in Figure 2 helps to identify  the7
proposed relationship between the structure, conduct, and performance of an industry or its
subsectors.  This model represents a synthesis of  many oligopoly models that assume firms behave
in a cooperative manner.  Cooperation leads to collusion in more concentrated markets, and this leads
to market power with monopolistic pricing.  This framework has been criticized  in the economics
profession because it does not emanate from a general theory and it yields limited predictability.  It
does, however, provide a visual framework for thinking about the structure and performance of sets
of firms in given locations. In general, this model hypothesizes that as the structure is more
concentrated and/or the products have more value added, profits and prices will increase.
An alternative approach, embodied in the New Empirical Industrial Organization is based on
assumptions of noncooperative behavior; it places conduct rather than structure at the center of inquiry
(Bresnahan, 1989).  It elaborates on three well-known models of noncooperative behavior: 1)
Cournot’s model, where firms conjecture that other firms hold output constant; 2) Bertrand pricing,
 where firms conjecture that other firms’ prices are held constant;  and 3) the dominant firm theory
where it is assumed that fringe firms are price takers (Connor, 1996).  Noncooperative models have
produced a number of analyses that quantify the degree of cooperation by a measure called
“conjectural variation.”  Analysis is typically based on time-series and intra-industry data; average firm
conduct (cooperation) is determined in each time period. These models do not produce information
about the sources of change in industry-wide conduct or performance (Connor, 1996).  They are,
however,  preferred by most analysts in recent times.  The dominant firm model seems to 
fit the manufacturing end of the food sector rather well, in that many food categories have dominant
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 Private labels are,  however, on the rise. Supermarket and drug store chains are selling their
own private label brands in direct competition with well known and long standing national brands.
Between 1989 and 1997, the unit share of private label products sold increased from 16.4 percent to
20.6 percent. In dollar terms,  private labels’ share rose from 11.6 to 15.9 percent over the same time
period. Since 1995, dollar sales of private labels have increased more than 11.4 percent, three times
faster than the dollar sales of national brands. These percentages may seem small, but a 1 percent
change  in sales equates to about $1.8 billion and one billion units of products (PLMA; Angrisani;
Kinsey, 1998b ).
Most  of the economic studies discussed in this review of literature on retail food firms were
formulated around the relationship between structure and performance.  They can be divided into two
main branches: 1) The relationship between concentration ratios and prices;  2) The relationship
between concentration ratios and profits.  Extensions of these works examine barriers to entry and
shifts in power between manufacturers and retailers.
Concentration and Prices
There are two dominant hypotheses about the relationship between market concentration and
product prices.  One, the mainstream school that relies on specific oligopolistic (cooperative)  models,
predicts more concentrated markets lead directly to higher prices.  The second is the  Demsetz (1973)
hypothesis which postulates that concentrated markets can experience economies of scale, lower
costs, and higher profits.  Lower consumer prices can exist in tandem with these conditions denying
the positive relationship between concentration and retail prices.  In addition, Anderson (1990)
suggests that when more concentrated markets offer higher levels of service; their prices may be10
higher, but this is due to consumers’ demand for services.  These hypotheses suggest testing the
effects of concentration (a measure of market power) on profitability and changes in retail price.
   Weiss (1989) reviewed more than 70 studies on the relationship of concentration and price
and found them to be positively correlated in 73 percent of the cases.  Schmalensee (1989) also
reviewed literature on concentration and price and concluded that there is strong evidence that
concentration raises prices.  Newmark (1990) cites five studies from the 1970's and 1980's (Marion
et al, 1977, 1979; Hall et al, 1979; Lamm, 1982; Meyer et al, 1983; and Cotterill, 1986) that test the
relationship between grocery store concentration and the price of a typical market basket of food. All
found that increased concentration was significantly correlated with higher prices.  For a set of stores
in Vermont in the 1980's (Cotterill, 1986) and another set of stores in and around Arkansas’s
metropolitan areas, Cotterill (1995) found that concentration is unrelated to service and positively
related to price.  In this region other factors related to prices were store format, store costs, market
demand factors, and whether the firm competes with a warehouse  store. 
However,  those who focus on the cost/efficiency side (known as the Demsetz or the  Chicago
hypothesis) argue that higher prices can reflect the higher costs of services from which consumers
receive value.  Individual stores in more highly concentrated markets can use service (nonprice
competition)  as a competitive strategy to attract customers who are willing to pay for it. Newmark
(1990) included consumers’ income as a proxy for the demand for services when explaining prices
and found no significant relationship between retail grocery prices and concentration.  He regressed
grocery-basket price on seller concentration, household income, market size, market growth and
average store sales using data from 27 cities.  In all cases, concentration was insignificant and income
was positive and significant, supporting the hypothesis that higher prices are related not to11
concentration but to a demand for more retail services in higher income areas.  It does not directly
defeat or support the Demsetz hypotheses since it says nothing about costs, but it contributes to the
debate about the impact of concentration.  For example, neither Cotterill (1986) nor Binkley and
Conner (1996) found a positive relationship between income and prices when studying concentration
in metropolitan grocery markets.
Kaufman and Handy (1989) found a negative correlation between concentration and prices.
This study, conducted by the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of
Agriculture, set out to correct some perceived flaws in earlier studies.  They deliberately selected a
random sample of  product prices and stores, rather than using stores in one locality and prices of a
market basket limited to identical brands and sizes of  products.  Unfortunately, this study has been
highly criticized for its city sample, which included New York City and coding problems, because
product quality and (brand) differentiation was not held constant across stores (Geithman and Marion,
1993).  Kauffan and Handy (1993) rebut these criticisms, claiming that competing stores rarely sell
identical items and that price indices based on random sampling are a better way to collect price data
for this type of study.  They also point out that a review of literature back into the 1960's reveals that
a negative relationship between concentration and prices is not as unusual as Geithman and Marion
(1993) assert.  Indeed, they claim that the limited data used in many of the studies in the 1970's and
1980's may have biased the results in favor of  a positive relationship between prices and
concentration.  
This debate is not settled yet.  In the real world, as new superstores (e.g. Wal-Mart, Kmart,
Sainsbury, Carrefour) enter the retail food business, with known economies of scale and competitive
price cutting behavior, it is unknown which of the prior research outcomes will hold.  These new,12
bigger-than-ever food stores may well capture a larger-than-ever  percent of food sales in local areas
by offering consumers lower prices.  Furthermore, as stores manage their revenues and tailor prices
to individual customers through consumer loyalty programs, it is increasingly difficult to know what
price the average consumers face and what services they are choosing.  Loyalty programs enable the
retailer to identify their best customers (who have agreed to join a shopper’s program) and
electronically  track  purchases and reward those that shop most often or spend the most money.
Often the reward is in the form of discounted prices on specific items or a percentage discount on the
total purchase.   
Anderson (1993) points out that in concentrated markets where similar large supermarkets
have similarly  large market shares, they will offer lower prices because they have real economies of
scale and they will compete for customers by lowering prices.  This is the “contestable market”
hypothesis.  Cotterill (1993, p. 227) categorically denies these types of markets exist in the retail food
sector.  I suggest the evidence is evolving and  incomplete.  
In a new study of the relationship between concentration and pricing in the late 1980s, Binkley
and Connor (1996) incorporate new forms of competition into a model to explain grocery prices.
They conclude that the degree of supermarket rivalry is no longer the only important competitive
force and that competition from new store formats (warehouse stores, superstores), fast food places,
and small niche sellers can affect grocery prices.  They discovered that market concentration
positively affected the price of dry groceries and health and beauty aids (the traditional parts of the
store), but that there was no effect on the prices of fresh and chilled foods.  This is an important
finding because fresh and chilled food categories are growing as a portion of total store sales while
dry grocery is declining.  As consumers buy more of their foods in fresh, chilled or ready-to-eat form,13
the prices of dry grocery will have less impact on the cost of the total market basket and be less
important for public policy or private profit. 
 Retail versus Manufacturer Power and Profits
Over the last decade a popular observation  is that “power” has shifted downstream from food
manufacturers to food retailers.  Changes  leading  to this widespread belief include continued
consolidation among retailers, ever bigger stores, improved inventory control, and more information
about customers obtained through scanner technology, loyalty programs, and higher quality
management.  Budgets for media advertising are said to be decreasing, while sales promotions within
stores,  private label products, and consumer loyalty programs are increasing.  Retail concentration
appears to be increasing at the local and regional levels, while manufacturing concentration is
increasing at the national and global level.  
Mainstream economic theory predicts that increased concentration implies increased market
power, and increased market power should increase profits.  The concentration-profit relationship
is a thoroughly tested hypothesis.   Profits are generally found to be positively correlated with
concentration (Scherer and Ross, 1990).  Marion et al (1977)  verified this prediction result for six
of the top twelve food chains in the United States and twenty-eight A&P stores during the 1970's.
After several studies, Cotterill concludes: “Profits are higher in more concentrated markets due to
the exercise of market power”(Cotterill, 1993, p. 233).14
Table 2
Return on Sales and Equity of Nine Leading U.S. Supermarket Chains: 
1996 or 1997
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chain Return Return Return 
On Sales on Assets on Equity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent
Kroger 1.4 6.0 NA
Wal-Mart 2.9 7.7 17.8
Safeway 2.7 8.3 52.8
American
Stores 1.5 3.3 33.0
SUPERVALU 1.1 4.1 21.4
Fleming 0.2 0.7 34.2
Albertsons 3.5 9.9 21.0
Ahold 1.7 4.3 30.5
Winn-Dixie 1.5 7.0 15.3
Average for top 9:  1.8 5.7 26.6
Average for Industry 
(Large Stores) 1.3 3.7 18.3
Source: Lexis/Nexis: Standard & Poors WEB site.15
Looking at current returns on sales, assets, and equity of the top nine publicly held
supermarket chains show that return on sales is not always higher than the industry average of 1.3
percent. (The tenth firm, H.E.Butt is privately held; financial data is not available.)  Neither the  return
on assets nor the return on equity is uniformly higher than the industry average (Table 2). This
snapshot provides no insight into the accounting methods or dynamics of individual firms,  but the
results tend to be consistent with theoretical predictions.  The average of all three returns for the nine
companies is higher than the overall industry average. 
Messinger and Narasimhan (1995) and Farris and Ailawadi (1992) analyzed the relationship
between power shifts and profits in the food industry.  Their basic premise was that  if power has
shifted to food retailers, then  profits of retailers should have increased relatively more than profits
of food manufacturers over the last twenty years. They found that manufacturers’ profits had
increased while the profits of retailers were steady.  Therefore, they concluded that power had not
shifted in the direction of retailers.
Measuring Profit
Research testing whether relative profitability has changed, includes testing new and better
measures of profitability.  This quest for better measures is stimulated partly by the failure of  early
studies to find any evidence that retail stores were garnering more power and because profit-
concentration studies were known to have measurement and interpretation problems (Newmark,
1990).  Using accounting data to measure economic profits was sharply criticized by Anderson
(1993).  The Lerner Index, an economic measure of monopoly power, is the difference between price
and marginal economic cost divided by price.  The accounting profit margin is often used as a proxy
for this index even though it is equal to price minus average accounting costs divided by price16
(Anderson, 1993).  Nevertheless, it is common practice to use gross margins and before tax return
on sales and/or assets to measure profits.  Messinger and Narasimham (1995) added return on equity
and returns on stock portfolios to provide further evidence on the relative changes in profitability
between food manufacturers and retailers.  They found an increase in returns to retail companies in
1982, just when the Justice Department published more liberal merger guidelines.   Overall, however,
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there were no significant differences in the relative performance of the portfolios of retail stores and
manufacturers of packaged goods  between 1976 and 1990. 
Ailwadi, Borin and Farris (1995) added the costs of capital to the cost side of the profit
equation and incorporated stock market evaluations of the value of a firm.  A unique feature of this
study is the ability to distinguish between power exercised and latent or potential power.  In most
studies, the various measures of profitability are considered a proxy for power that has already been
exercised, since profits are the observed outcome of having power.  These measures of profit include
gross margins, return on sales, return on investment, return on assets , and  economic value added
(EVA).  EVA is  gross revenue (sales)  minus the cost of goods sold, operating costs, and  capital
costs. (See Appendix A for definitions.)        
To measure latent or potential power,  a measure of market value added  (MVA)  was
designed by Ailwadi, Borin and Farris (1995) which indicates the present value of the expected future
EVA.  It is sometimes called the “goodwill” of a firm or the market power which is being
accumulated for future use.  It is calculated as the sum of the firm’s stock market value minus the
book value over some time period which translates into the  present value of future EVA.  This
measure depends on the assumption that capital markets are perfectly informed and efficient so that
the market value of a stock accounts for the future “power” or expected profitability of  a firm. 17
Evidence of a Power/Profit Shift?
        Ailwadi, Borin and Ferris (1995) then used the MVA to look at the relative profitability of
retailers and manufacturers in thirteen industries including food between 1982 and 1992.  They found
that in only three industries were retailers' profits increasing faster than manufacturers' ￿  apparel,
computers, and jewelry.  They also removed the effect of Wal-Mart from the “other general
merchandisers” category  and found that without Wal-Mart, the MVA of general merchandisers was
actually somewhat less than for retail food stores, but less than 1 percent of the MVA of Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart clearly drives the overall MVA of general merchandisers.  Although Wal-Mart’s return on
sales and assets has been rather flat, its meteoric rise in EVA and MVA is due to its relatively low
operation costs.  In fact,  the Wal-Mart phenomenon may be an example of the Demsetz hypothesis
which predicts that when concentration is due to economies of scale;  a few large stores will operate
even in small markets.  The economies of scale for Wal-Mart are widely believed to be due to their
central buying power and modern distribution system.  Their profitability comes from lower cost of
goods sold and operating efficiencies, rather than the ability or propensity to raise prices.  Where they
force other large retailers to compete with them on price, they may help to create a contestable
market situation.   
Connor et al (1996) also failed to find any empirical support for the idea that retailers  were
gaining market power.  At least they were unable to show concentration among food manufacturers.
They measured retail power using market shares for private labels (versus national brands) of  48
individual food product classes. The hypothesis was that increased retail power would be identified
by an increase in the market share of private retail brands (private labels). Their measure of
concentration on the manufacturing side was the change in the CR-4 between 1967 and 1987.  Like18
others, they found that starting in the 1980's, the theoretical and structural/empirical relationships
between concentration and private labels’ share of the market, total advertising to sales ratios, and
minimum efficient size began to crumble.  Historical patterns no longer seem to hold.  They speculate
that perhaps the new age of information and technology and a proliferation of products and brands
has dramatically changed the nature of the relationship between food manufacturers and retailers.
Or, that the aggregated data which is available to researchers and which worked well on (older) more
nearly homogeneous consumer goods (like milk or beef) is inadequate to test relationships in the
modern world of highly differentiated products, electronic scanning data and niche markets with
global sources.  
Additional explanations for the inability of various researchers to find a shift in power from
manufacturers to retailers in the food industry are that a power shift might precede a profit shift and
retailers may not be exercising all the power they have.  Another explanation is that the numerous
small specialty retailers have not gained much power, but a few large, well-informed, and efficient
retailers have gained significant power.  By aggregating all retailers’ profits together, on average, they
do not appear to have gained power.  Also, there is intense inter-retailer competition which precludes
a concerted effort by national or global companies  to exercise monopoly power.   While food
retailers are busy competing with each other,  big general merchandisers, and fast food places,  the
manufacturers (and perhaps the wholesalers and brokers) may be bargaining away profits in the
distribution channel for themselves.  A third possibility suggested by Farris and Ailawadi (1992) is
that profits seem to have declined on both ends of the channel and consumers are enjoying the
benefits through lower prices.  The possibility of profits shifting to brokers and wholesalers is
unexplored in this literature. 19
International Evidence
       Literature from scholars in the United Kingdom helps us understand the failure of economic
models to tie profits and concentration together in the modern retail food business.  Frances and
Garnsey (1996) describe a shift in power to the retailers that derives from systematic coordination
of the supply and distribution of products to the store.  Vertical coordination made possible by the
scanner data available to retailers has allowed a “quick response partnershipping” to ensure
continuous replenishment of inventory and an accountability from suppliers to retailers in the name
of service to the consumer.   (An industry wide program to adopt this system in the United States is
called Efficient Consumer Response (ECR)).  This hegemonic system depends on an oligopolistic
market structure to survive.  Too many competitors would dilute the control over suppliers and a
monopoly would reduce incentives to innovate and improve performance.  This is like a patronage
system where prices are set by method of  “market price minus” rather than a “supplier cost plus.”
It builds a managed market where everyone seems to benefit relatively to open market transactions,
but it defies standard economic analysis  and helps to explain why concentration does not always
result in higher prices or in greater profits.  In fact, profits are sometimes sacrificed to gain market
share which may eventually increase profits by driving down costs.  In this system the suppliers may
make good profits as a dedicated supplier to a supermarket chain, but they have little power and often
low concentration ratios. 
Viane and Gellynck(1995) from Belgium points out that growing concentration in European
retail food markets derive mostly from consumers’ demand for variety and quality and from improved
costs. Costs have declined due to supply management and negotiated relationships (another way to
refer to the quick response system) and due to penetration into external markets. They found the most20
concentration in the United Kingdom.  Looking at subsectors by types of food (chocolates, milk, etc.)
they found that profits, prices, and productivity were greater in the more concentrated sectors.
Profits were higher for more highly processed food, implying that consumers are willing to pay more
than the production costs for the value added in ready-to-eat foods.  
Barriers to Entry - Another Sign of Market Power
One of the classic indications of  monopoly power is a market with barriers to entry.  The
abilities of firms to enter the retail grocery market have been studied by Cotterill and Haller (1992)
and Chevalier(1995).  Cotterill and Haller estimated the probability of any one of the twenty top U.S.
grocery chains entering markets in 129 different metropolitan areas between 1972 and 1981.  They
found that the probability of entry was increased by growing local market demand, competent
management which was measured by return on equity  of the entering firm, and close proximity to
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warehouses they were already doing business with.  The probability of entry was decreased by greater
market concentration and the number of different chains already in the market.  Overall, they found
that there was an 8 percent chance that at least one potential entrant would enter a local market over
a two-year period.  An increase in the return on equity (competency)  of 10 percent increased the
probability of entry to 14.4 percent.  The outstanding example of a successful firm entering several
markets during this time was Albertsons, a firm known for competent management.  Subsequently,
in August 1998, Albertsons acquisition of American Stores made it the first U.S. retail supermarket
chain with stores stretching form coast to coast. 
The entry, exit, and expansion of supermarket chains was studied by Chevalier (1995) to see
if a leveraged buyout (LBO) of one or more firms in an area leads to a softer or a tougher product-
market. Softer competition is defined as firms having less variation among firms in the price-cost21
margins.  If either is true, it would establish that there is a link between financing and product-market
effects.  Chevalier’s (1995) event study examined the daily stock market returns (1985-1988) of
thirteen supermarkets that rivaled one that announced a LBO.  For four separate LBO’s the stock
price of rivals went up after the announcement,  indicating that competition becomes softer when a
local firm announces a LBO.That is, the investors expected future profits of rival supermarket chains
to rise when a competing supermarket announces it is undertaking a LBO.  
Looking at the number of stores in each Metropolitan Statistical Area suggests that the
announcement of a LBO with a 10 percent market share would lead non-LBO stores to expand by
6.5 percent, increase expectations about their future profitability, and increase the probability of entry
by rival firms.  This supports the idea that firms that undergo a LBO tend to be weak in the first place.
By announcing an increase in debt financing they reveal their vulnerability and attract rival firms into
the market which tends to narrow the variation in price-cost margins (profits).
This is consistent with Cotterill’s (1993) conclusion that the  effect of entry or merger is to
challenge the largest chains.  It may decrease the profits of individual leading firms, but it does not
increase market rivalry.  Profits of the industry as a whole rise. 
Conclusions
After reviewing several research studies that examined the relationship of market
concentration and food prices and profitability of  the retail food industry and finding mixed evidence,
one is compelled to ask how important the questions and answers are in an economy where food
prices and expenditures are falling relative to household incomes.  Recall that much of this research
started with a Congressional inquiry about whether retail level concentration was responsible for
rising food prices in a time of high inflation.  Since then, real household food expenditures in the22
United States have fallen by about one-third and the proportion of household income spent on food
has fallen from 18 percent to about 11 percent.  Instead of jeopardizing consumers' disposable
income, the food industries’ offerings, in the face of rising incomes, has freed up increasing
proportions of disposable income for consumers to spend on a growing variety of goods and services.
Consumer welfare with respect to food and general economic growth seems to have benefitted from
efficiencies in the retail food system.  So, although  research related to the question of monopoly
power in the food industry has produced some intellectually interesting theories and measures of
profitability,  it has not richly informed consumers or public policy makers about the state of the
industry as it operates today.  This is not to say that the principles discovered and methodologies
developed are not important; they can be applied to other markets or industries or countries where
retail competition may be less and monopoly behavior more damaging to consumer and social
welfare.  
Looking beyond the profits and prices of local  grocery stores to distribution channels would
improve the quality of questions and answers  in this line of research.  The article by Frances and
Garney (1996) is particularly informative about the modern structure and it applies well beyond the
boundaries of the United Kingdom.  Regardless of the concentration of ownership of  local grocery
stores, there is great competition between them and, between them and other food outlets in a local
retail market. The study by Binkley and Connor (1996) illustrates the importance of this on food
prices.  A recent industry publication (Chain Store Guide, 1997) indicates that of  the 100 largest
metropolitan areas of the United States, 24 had CR-4 ratios of more than 80 percent and 18 had a
single grocery chain with more than 40 percent of the market share.  In no area were there less than
nine chains (or independents) to choose from and in most areas there were more than a dozen23
choices.   Most grocers consider their competition to be within three miles of their store, even if it
is another store with the same name.  The complicated ownership arrangements of chain stores make
it possible for a company operated stores and a franchised store with the same name to compete
directly for the same customers, each with its own pricing strategies.  
The pace of concentration at the wholesale and broker levels is also intense and the
opportunities for oligopolistic or monopolistic power at that level are probably greater than at the
retail level.  These distributors are acting to decrease costs through economies of scale while adding
services to their customers - the retalers.  A new study by Johnson and Connor (1998) found that
greater concentration at the wholesale level (including self-distributing chains) was associated with
lower retail food prices. This is consistent with monopolistic competition theory  and with economies
of scale being passed on to consumers in order to capture larger market share.
Summarizing  the review of the evidence about  relationships between market concentration
and prices, power, and profits  yielded  mixed results, especially with regard to price.  Concentration
was associated with both increased and decreased prices in various studies.  It was less likely to affect
prices of foods in the expanding parts of the store, fresh produce, delicatessens, and chilled products.
These are the so-called value added foods where prices reflect the costs of services performed for
consumers and for which they are willing to pay. 
Profits were more uniformly associated with concentration, but the reason is unclear.  Most
studies imply that it is due to lower costs in more concentrated industries.  These costs have been and
are being  lowered in the retail food business through the use of information technology and vertical
coordination with suppliers.  There was no evidence that retailers’ profits were increasing faster than
the profits of food manufacturers. 24
The weakest links in terms of the research seem to be a lack of definitive relationships
between concentration and cost and value added products and service.  Most observers agree that
concentration and economies of scale go together, implying that more concentrated industries should
have lower costs and lower prices for consumers.  This works as long as there is some mechanism
to maintain a non-cooperative oligopolistic structure that prevents monopolistic pricing.  Casual
observation implies that retail food firms engage in fierce price competition and where prices are high,
it is usually due to adding value and services for which consumers are willing to pay.  A recent news
article implied that concentration in the food manufacturing sector has forced them to decrease costs,
but at the expense of creative talent to invent new value added products (McCarthy, 1997).  This
implies that value added and concentration may be negatively correlated and that innovation and value
added will shift to smaller firms serving niche markets along side of the large, concentrated firms.
This is, in fact, what we observe, especially in markets  where consumers are diverse and demand
quality and variety in their food supply. 
Footnotes:
1.  CR4 refers to the concentration of the four largest firms in a  market area.  For example, if
the largest four retail food stores in a given market (usually a city) together have 70 percent
of  the market, the CR4 will be 70.  In the case of a set of manufacturers, the market would
be identified as the set of stores that are their customers.  
2.  In 1982 the U.S. Justice Department changed the rules for mergers which allowed more
liberal vertical mergers, maintaining limitations on large horizontal mergers (Lovett, 1987).
3.   Return on equity is not on Ailawadi et al’s  list of profit measures  (Appendix A) but it is
essentially the net income divided by equity where equity is assets adjusted for debt financing.25
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Definitions of Variables used to measure profit and/or concentration
Concentration Measures (Martin, 1988)
Herfindahl Index  - Used in the 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines to explain to business
people which mergers the government would consider challenging. The government publishes
the 4-digit SIC level Herfindahl Index beginning with the 1982 Census of Manufacturers.  It
is the sum of squares of the market shares of the firms in the industry.   H = s  +  s ...+...s 12 2 N
22    2
 The more firms in the industry the smaller the Index. If there is a single firm - a monopolist,
H = 1.
CR4 - the percent of the market shared by the top four firms in the industry on a local or regional
basis. 
Profit Measures (Ailawadi et al, 1995)
 Gross  Margin = Sales - Cost of Goods Sold / Sales  
Return on Sales = Sales - Cost of Goods Sold - Operating Costs / Sales
Return on Investment = Sales - cost of Goods Sold - Operating Costs / Invested Capital
Return on Assets = Sales - Cost of Goods Sold - Operating Costs / Total Assets
Economic Value Added = Sales - Cost of Goods Sold - Operating Costs - Cost of Capital
Market Value Added =    Stock Market Value  - Book Value    (Market power being  tt
accumulated for the future)
 
                                                       where r = discount rate.            